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CLEARING THE AIR: DOES CHOOSING AGENCY 
DEFERENCE IN SECURITY CLEARANCE RULINGS 
DILUTE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES? 
By: Frank Russo+ 
The ability to obtain a security clearance has a wide-ranging impact from job 
placement to questions of fitness in a presidential election.  Sustaining a 
functional career in intelligence, national security, and many other federal fields 
within the United States is nearly impossible without proper security clearance.1  
In 2016, the importance of proper clearance evolved into a national debate as 
each presidential candidate staked claims that their opposition should be 
excluded from receiving sensitive material.2  Democratic presidential nominee 
and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was accused of mishandling 
classified information while serving as Secretary of State, leading Congress to 
introduce a bill removing the nominee’s clearance.3  Her opponent, Republican 
nominee and current U.S. President Donald J. Trump, faced mounting criticism 
over his ability to keep sensitive information secret, leading to calls for the 
nominee to be denied customary national security briefings.4  As the election 
process brought security clearance procedures into the public eye, the mundane 
bureaucratic chatter surrounding the subject turned to polarizing debates within 
a national election.  Following the election, the discussions surrounding security 
clearances did not subside as White House officials were accused of violating 
                                                 
 + J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2018; B.A., The University 
of Georgia, 2015. I would like to thank Professor David Hodgkinson for his guidance throughout 
the writing of this Comment. I also extend my gratitude to the Catholic University Law Review for 
their assistance in editing and publishing this Comment. Particularly, I am grateful to Thomas 
Gentry, Richard Smith, Esperanza Sanchez, Ruth Ann Mueller, Kate Sullivan and the entire 
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 1. See All About Security Clearances, DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/m/ds/clearances/ 
c10978.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2018). 
 2. See, e.g., Ivan Levingston, Intelligence Briefings Become Flashpoint for Trump and 
Clinton Campaigns, CNBC (Aug. 5, 2016, 3:17 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/05/intelligen 
ce-briefings-become-flashpoint-for-trump-and-clinton-campaigns.html (“‘I don’t think it’s safe to 
have Hillary Clinton be briefed on national security because the word will get out’ Trump said.”). 
 3. Katie Bo Williams, House Bill Would Revoke Clinton’s Security Clearance, THE HILL 
(July 7, 2016, 2:34 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/287247-house-bill-would-revo 
ke-clintons-security-clearance. 
 4. Leigh Ann Caldwell & Robert Windrem, Could Candidate Donald Trump Be Denied 
National Security Briefings?, NBC NEWS (July 29, 2016, 4:01 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/pol 
itics/2016-election/could-candidate-donald-trump-be-denied-national-security-briefings-n619156. 
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standard clearance procedures.5  Political opponents of President Trump 
introduced legislation to revoke the clearance of senior White House advisers.6  
Despite growing attention from politicians and national media, little scholarship 
has been produced examining the federal judiciary’s role in handling national 
security clearance disputes. 
Federal government agencies dictate the terms of security clearance 
procedures including application review, denial, and acceptance.7  Similarly, 
agency heads are responsible for establishing revocation procedures.8  A loss of 
a security clearance at an agency is almost always followed by loss of 
employment.9  An employee is able to appeal a revocation to the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (MSPB or the Board).10  The Supreme Court first addressed 
this process in Department of Navy v. Egan,11 deciding that the MSPB was 
correct in refusing to review the substance and evidentiary conclusions of an 
agency’s security clearance revocation decision.12  Additionally, the Supreme 
Court refused to conduct its own substantive review of the revocation.13 
The decision in Egan has defined security clearance jurisprudence over the 
past three decades.14  Two competing camps have materialized since the Egan 
precedent took hold of security clearance jurisprudence.  The first advocates for 
the federal judiciary to strictly follow the administrative decisions and deny 
substantive reviews of security clearance decisions and procedures.15  
Supporters of the Egan decision reason that national security concerns outweigh 
the constitutional considerations of a security clearance decision and, therefore, 
should not be questioned by the federal judiciary.16  Whereas, critics of the Egan 
                                                 
 5. See, e.g., Katie Bo Williams & Jordan Fabian, Questions Grow Over Kushner’s Security 
Clearances, THE HILL (July 17, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3421 
20-questions-grow-over-kushners-security-clearances (“Calls for [Jared] Kushner to lose his 
security clearance have mounted . . . .”). 
 6. Igor Bobic, Republicans Block Effort to Revoke Jared Kushner’s Security Clearance, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2017, 1:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/jared-kushne 
r-security-clearance_us_596783aae4b0a0c6f1e67433 (describing a proposed amendment revoking 
security clearances for Kushner and White House Staff who “deliberately fail to disclose meetings 
with foreign nationals.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 7. Exec. Order No. 12,968, 3 C.F.R. 391, 392, 397 (1995). 
 8. Id. at 397, 399–400. 
 9. Katrina J. Church, Loss or Denial of Security Clearance: An Employee’s Rights, 4 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 197, 198 (1988). 
 10. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d) (2006) (“An employee against whom an action is taken under this 
section is entitled to appeal to the Merit System Protection Board . . . .”). 
 11. 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 
 12. See id. at 529–32. 
 13. Id. at 529–34. 
 14. See Charles Pollack, Comment, A Delicate Balance: Federal Employees, Security 
Clearances, and the Role of the Federal Circuit, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 133, 147 (2013) (“The Supreme 
Court has not clarified how Egan should limit Federal Circuit review since the late 1980s.”). 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 135 (arguing for a limited judicial review of security clearance denials). 
 16. See id.  Mr. Pollack notes: 
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decision argue that legislative changes are needed to expand the federal 
judiciary’s role in reviewing security clearance revocation procedures.17  These 
critics claim federal employees in the security field deserve a thorough process 
that includes a substantive review of both the procedures and explanations 
behind a clearance revocation or denial.18 
Each approach exhibits the friction that exists between constitutional rights 
and national security concerns when reviewing security clearance disputes.19  
However, both camps overvalue one aspect of the divide that would lead the 
respective approaches to damage the federal judiciary’s role in security 
clearance jurisprudence.  This Comment advocates for a third approach, first 
explored in the concurring opinion of Hegab v. Long,20 where the federal 
judiciary should only conduct substantive reviews of the policies underlying a 
security clearance revocation when there is a constitutional challenge against a 
specific procedure or rule.21  Precedent established in Webster v. Doe,22 decided 
in the same year as Egan, allows courts to review constitutional challenges to 
national security employment policies, while not encroaching the boundaries of 
national security power vested in the other branches of government.23 
This Comment begins with a detailed history of modern security clearance 
procedures and MSPB reviews of clearance revocations.  Part I focuses on those 
who need security clearances and how these clearances can be obtained, denied, 
or revoked.  Part I then concludes with a review of the statutorily defined MSPB 
rules and procedures.  In Part II, the conflict between due process rights and 
national security concerns is explored.  Part II finishes with an overview of the 
two modern arguments, one side advocating for due process versus the other 
advocating for national security.  Part III centers on a detailed explanation of the 
third approach addressed in Hegab by offering a new way forward for judicial 
review of security clearances that shows how the limited expansion of the federal 
                                                 
Supreme Court precedents make substantive review on national security issues 
unnecessary because the federal government ultimately has the responsibility to “provide 
for the common defense, [and] promote the general Welfare of all citizens.”  These 
responsibilities require that the President and Congress make national security decisions, 
and the Supreme Court has consequently affirmed that such determinations are not suited 
for the judiciary. 
Id. at 134 (footnotes omitted). 
 17. See, e.g., Nadia A. Patel, You’re Fired! Egan and MSPB Review of Security Clearance 
Decisions, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 93, 94 (2011) (arguing for an amendment to the Civil Service Reform 
Act “to expressly authorize the MSPB to review the merits of security clearance denials that are 
the basis of adverse employment actions”). 
 18. See id. at 101. 
 19. See Pollack, supra note 14, at 134; see also Patel, supra note 17, at 94. 
 20. 716 F.3d 790 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that an employee at the National Geospatial 
Intelligence Agency was not entitled to a review after his clearance was revoked upon discovery of 
his marriage to a woman identified as a foreign national). 
 21. Id. at 797–98 (Motz, J., concurring). 
 22. 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
 23. See id. at 603–05. 
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judiciary’s role in security clearance revocation protects both constitutional due 
process and national security interests.  Part IV concludes by reinforcing the 
need for greater attention in security clearance jurisprudence throughout 
academia. 
I. AMERICAN HISTORY SHAPES THE PROCESSES FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE IN 
MODERN TIMES 
A. The Value of a Clearance 
The United States has placed significant emphasis on protecting vital national 
security information through legislation and executive orders beginning with the 
passage of the Civil Service Act of 1883, which required individuals seeking 
federal employment to be of “good” character, reputation, and fitness.24  In 
modern times, federal agencies rely on security clearances to ensure their 
employees meet the standards required to handle and protect sensitive 
information.25  Essentially, the need for clearances is driven by two principles: 
protection and secrecy.26  Protecting sensitive information is vital to the federal 
government’s ability to handle diplomatic negotiations and military actions.27  
Secrecy, in theory, also incentivizes bureaucrats to debate policy without fear of 
public retribution when discussing sensitive material with fellow decision-
makers.28 
Security clearances are also of significant importance to individuals seeking 
employment in the federal government.  Employees holding clearances earn, on 
average, twenty-two percent more than individuals who do not.29  In addition to 
the financial benefit, individuals who are able to earn a clearance have greater 
employment prospects because the pool of cleared agency and intelligence 
community (IC) workers is shrinking.30  Security clearances are an integral part 
                                                 
 24. William Henderson, A Brief History of the U.S. Personnel Security Program, 
CLEARANCEJOBS (June 29, 2009), https://news.clearancejobs.com/2009/06/29/a-brief-history-of-
the-u-s-personnel-security-program/; see also Civil Service Act of 1883, Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 
Stat. 403. 
 25. MICHELLE D. CHRISTENSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS: 
ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43216.p 
df. 
 26. See Patel, supra note 17, at 95. 
 27. Harvard Law Review Association, Information Security: Classification of Government 
Documents, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (1972) [hereinafter Information Security]. 
 28. Id. at 1191–92 (“If an official knows that his recommendations will shortly be made 
public, there is a danger that he might hedge his advice in order to avoid embarrassing his superiors 
or to attract favorable public attention to himself, thus injuring the governmental interest in 
exposing decisionmakers to a broad range of viewpoints.”). 
 29. Katherine Walsh, Security Clearances Worth an Extra $19k Per Year?, CSO (Apr. 11, 
2008, 8:00 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2122323/it-careers/numbers—-security-cleara 
nces-worth-an-extra—19k-per-year-.html. 
 30. See NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & SEC. CTR., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY 
CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS 1, 5, 7, 12–13 (2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/News 
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of federal employment and the work bureaucrats do on a daily basis, which begs 
the question: how did clearances come to play such a significant role in our 
government, and how has the process for obtaining clearance changed over 
time? 
B. The History of Security Clearances 
Safe guarding sensitive information came to the forefront of the American 
legislative focus following the outbreak of World War I (WWI).31  The first 
system of classification was borne from the American Expeditionary Force 
procedures established for handling classified information during WWI.32  
Sensitive documents were separated into groups labeled “Secret,” 
“Confidential,” or “For Official Circulation Only.”33  Following WWI, Congress 
expanded the Executive’s authority to control sensitive national security 
information within the military, and established criminal punishments for the 
dissemination of information without executive permission.34  President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower further extended such authority to include civilian agencies in 
1951, effectively giving the Executive Branch exclusive control over regulating 
the procedures for the handling of sensitive information.35 
Through the last century, executive orders have regularly modified security 
clearance standards and procedures.36  Under the current system, sensitive 
information and clearances are separated into three levels: “Top secret,” 
“Secret,” and “Confidential.”37  Additionally, each agency head classifies 
                                                 
room/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2015-Annual_Report_on_Security_Clearance_Determinations.pd 
f. 
 31. See Information Security, supra note 27, at 1193 (“The outbreak of World War I prompted 
the passage of the Espionage Act of 1917, which spelled out the offenses [of national security 
violations] in greater detail, increased the severity of the penalties, and added new provisions 
dealing with acts of espionage in time of war.”); see also Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 
217. 
 32. Information Security, supra note 27, at 1193. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Espionage Act of 1938, ch. 2, § 1, 52 Stat. 3. 
 35. See Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 73 (1953). 
 36. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,968, 3 C.F.R. 391 (1995) (establishing a uniform, federal 
program to gain access to classified information); Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 
(Apr. 2, 1982) (establishing a uniform system to classify and declassify national security 
information); Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1978) (establishing a system to classify 
information as Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential); Exec. Order No. 11,652, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209 
(Mar. 10, 1972) (establishing a monitoring system to classify and declassify information). 
 37. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209, 5209–10 (Mar. 10, 1972).  Executive Order 
11,652 provides: (1) “Top Secret” shall be applied to information if its “unauthorized disclosure 
could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security”; (2) 
“Secret” shall be applied to information if its “unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be 
expected to cause serious damage to the national security”; and (3) “Confidential” shall be applied 
to information if its “unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the 
national security.”  Id. 
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employment positions within their department as either “Special-Sensitive,” 
“Critical-Sensitive,” or “Noncritical-Sensitive.”38  Previously, the Federal 
Investigative Services (FIS) handled ninety-five percent of federal background 
checks39 with the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO) 
handling Department of Defense (DOD) related security clearances.40  In 2016, 
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) established a new department, the National Background 
Investigations Bureau (NBIB), to handle security clearance procedures and 
background checks.41  According to the White House, the NBIB will be led by 
a presidential appointee who is responsible for overseeing the newly established 
agency and engaging in collaborative efforts with the DOD to ensure a smooth 
transition to the new system.42  The NBIB works directly with existing DOD 
databases to conduct background checks as well as implement new security 
procedures for safeguarding the information collected during the check.43 
C. Security Clearance Procedures 
Individuals seeking employment that requires access to classified information 
must gain a proper security clearance prior to beginning the occupation.44  
                                                 
 38. See 5 C.F.R. § 732.201(a) (2017) (explaining that the head of each agency classifies “any 
position within the department or agency the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the 
nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security as a sensitive position at 
one of three sensitivity levels”); see also Marko Hakamaa, Position Designation and the Type of 
Investigation Required, CLEARANCEJOBS (Aug. 4, 2014), https://news.clearancejobs.com/2014/0 
8/04/position-designation-type-investigation-required/ (explaining that the classification is based 
on (1) the level of risk the position poses to the agency or government and (2) what and how much 
sensitive classified material will the employee be handling). 
 39. Nicole Ogrysko, OPM, OMB to Stand Up New Agency, Director to Own Security 
Clearance Process, FEDERAL NEWS RADIO (Jan. 22, 2016, 11:50 AM), http://federalnewsradio.c 
om/opm-cyber-breach/2016/01/opm-announces-major-update-to-security-clearance-policy/. 
 40. William H. Henderson, Security Clearance Frequently Asked Questions, 
CLEARANCEJOBS, https://www.clearancejobs.com/security_clearance_faq.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 
2017). 
 41. Jamal Brown, Modernizing & Strengthening the Security & Effectiveness of Federal 
Background Investigations, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan. 22, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.white 
house.gov/blog/2016/01/22/modernizing-strengthening-security-effectiveness-federal-
background-investigations.  Additional changes include: 
1.  [e]stablishing a five-year reinvestigation requirement for all individuals with a 
security clearance, regardless of the level of access; 
2.  [r]educing the number of individuals with active security clearances by 17 percent; 
3.  [l]aunching programs to continuously evaluate personnel with security clearances to 
determine whether that individual continues to meet the requirements for eligibility; and 
4.  [d]eveloping recommendations to enhance information sharing between State, local, 
and Federal Law Enforcement entities when conducting background investigations. 
Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See All About Security Clearances, supra note 1. 
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President Eisenhower established the procedures for receiving a clearance in 
1960.45  The structural layout in Executive Order 10,865 (the Order) allowed for 
the DOD and other government agencies to conduct background checks prior to 
employing an individual who would handle sensitive information.46  Obtaining 
the required level of clearance entails going through a background check 
conducted by the appropriate agency.47  Individuals cannot obtain a security 
clearance on their own, instead sponsorship is required from a contractor or 
federal agency.48  Once a prospective employee receives sponsorship or a 
“conditional offer of employment,” the individual must fill out a “Standard Form 
86” security questionnaire, which is reviewed by the sponsoring agency’s human 
resources department for inconsistencies.49  Under the current structure, DOD 
clearances are handled by DISCO, and agencies that do not require a DOD 
clearance must file the applicant information with the NBIB to continue the 
investigation.50  If approved, the agency and NBIB then require the individual 
to meet with an investigator at least once, and may require additional meetings 
or polygraphs depending on the level of clearance required.51  The final decision 
to grant or deny the clearance falls on the agency or department in consultation 
with the NBIB.52 
                                                 
 45. Exec. Order No. 10,865, 3 C.F.R. 62 (1960), amended by Exec. Order No. 10,909, 3 
C.F.R. 75 (1961). 
 46. Id.; see also Church, supra note 9, at 200–01 (“[Executive Order 10,865] sets the 
framework for the ‘Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program,’ which is 
administered by the Department of Defense, and equivalent programs administered by other 
Government agencies.”). 
 47. All About Security Clearances, supra note 1; see also Brown, supra note 41 (explaining 
that a majority of background checks are conducted by the newly formed NBIB agency). 
 48. Henderson, supra note 40. 
 49. All About Security Clearances, supra note 1.  The stated purpose of the Standard Form 86 
is as follows: 
This [Standard Form 86] will be used by the United States (U.S.) Government in 
conducting background investigations, reinvestigations, and continuous evaluations of 
persons under consideration for, or retention of, national security positions as defined in 
5 CFR 732, and for individuals requiring eligibility for access to classified information 
under Executive Order 12968.  This form may also be used by agencies in determining 
whether a subject performing work for, or on behalf of, the Government under a contract 
should be deemed eligible for logical or physical access when the nature of the work to 
be performed is sensitive and could bring about an adverse effect on the national security. 
U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., OMB No. 3206-0005, QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 
POSITIONS 1 (2010). 
 50. See Henderson, supra note 40; Brown, supra note 41. 
 51. See All About Security Clearances, supra note 1; see also Passing the Polygraph, 
MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/veteran-jobs/security-clearance-jobs/passing-polygrap 
h.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2018). 
 52. See 32 C.F.R. § 147.2(b) (2016); see also Brown, supra note 41. 
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The second section of the Order addresses the process required when revoking 
or denying a security clearance.53  The Order specifies the minimum Due 
Process requirements for the removal of a clearance: 
1. [A] written statement of reasons why access to classified 
information may be denied or revoked (“Statement of Reasons”); 
2. [A]n opportunity to reply in writing; 
3. [A]n opportunity for a hearing after filing a written reply to the 
Statement of Reasons; 
4. [R]easonable time to prepare for the hearing; 
5. [T]he opportunity to be represented by counsel; 
6. [T]he opportunity to cross-examine persons on any matters (with a 
limitation on the disclosure of classified information) raised in the 
Statement of Reasons, other than the characterization of any 
organization or individual other than the applicant; and 
7. [W]ritten notice of the final decision concerning the allegations 
contained in the Statement of Reasons.54 
Initially, the Order specified the Secretary of Defense as the individual in 
charge of handling the revocation process or delegating revocation procedures.55  
However, under the current format, each federal agency handles its own 
processes and adjudications consistent with the minimum requirements set out 
in the Order.56 
Although not all processes are the same, each agency follows a basic format.  
Once a security clearance is denied or revoked, the agency will issue a 
“Statement of Reason” (SOR) or a similar letter of intent to the individual, which 
contains factual explanations for the denial or revocation.57  Agencies may 
explain within the SOR why granting the clearance would be inconsistent with 
national security concerns.58  If the individual is pursuing an appeal, they are 
then required to respond to the SOR and agency decision in writing.59  All 
applicants appealing a revocation or denial are “entitled to an oral hearing, which 
they must request in their written response to the SOR.  Hearings are trial-like 
                                                 
 53. Exec. Order No. 10,865, 3 C.F.R. 62 (1960), amended by Exec. Order No. 10,909, 3 
C.F.R. 75 (1961); see also Church, supra note 9, at 201 (discussing the Order’s minimum 
standards). 
 54. Church, supra note 9, at 201 (citing Exec. Order No. 10,865 § 3). 
 55. See id. 
 56. See John V. Berry, I’m a Lawyer Specializing in Security Clearance Cases. Hillary 
Clinton Got Off Easy, WASH. POST (July 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/im-
a-lawyer-specializing-in-security-clearance-cases-hillary-clinton-got-off-easy/2016/07/07/3810f3 
c-4480-11e6-bc99-7d269f8719b1_story.html?utm_term=.f5d6b5ec9578. 
 57. A Summary of the Security Clearance Appeals Process, BERRY & BERRY PLLC (Nov. 8, 
2013), http://www.berrylegal.com/resources/A_Summary_of_the_Security_Clearance_Appeals_P 
rocess/ [hereinafter BERRY & BERRY PLLC]. 
 58. See Patel, supra note 17, at 99. 
 59. BERRY & BERRY PLLC, supra note 57. 
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proceedings conducted before administrative law judges.”60  Following the 
written response and, if requested, oral hearing, the agency’s adjudicator will re-
review the individual’s application and decide whether to overturn the denial, 
uphold the agency’s decision, or request further information.61  If the 
employment position in question requires access to sensitive information, the 
revocation or denial of a clearance will cost the individual his or her job.62 
D. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board Review 
Federal government employees who lose clearance following the agency 
adjudication process are left with limited options for appeal.63  The Civil Service 
Reform Act (CSRA) permits government personnel to appeal security clearance 
revocation or adverse employment decisions to the MSPB for judicial review.64  
The MSPB serves as the independent agency responsible for addressing 
questions regarding the federal merit systems.65  However, it does not provide 
hearings for government employees on issues such as discrimination complaints, 
unfair labor complaints, adverse employment decisions unrelated to clearance 
revocation, or activities prohibited by civil service regulations.66  Government 
employees facing adverse employment effects from a clearance revocation may 
petition the regional MSPB Board within thirty days of the agency’s decision.67  
The appellant has the option of receiving representation before the MSPB 
appoints an administrative law judge (ALJ) to review the petition.68 
Once an appeal is filed, the ALJ alerts both petitioner-appellant and the 
agency of the impending review.69  The ALJ is responsible for holding pre-
                                                 
 60. See Patel, supra note 17, at 99 (footnote omitted). 
 61. BERRY & BERRY PLLC, supra note 57. 
 62. Church, supra note 9, at 198. 
 63. Id. at 214. 
 64. See Patel, supra note 17, at 94; see also Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
94-454, § 204(a), 92 Stat. 1111, 1137–38. 
 65. See About MSPB, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BOARD, http://www.mspb.gov/a 
bout/about.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2018). 
The Merit Systems Protection Board is an independent, quasi-judicial agency in the 
Executive branch that serves as the guardian of Federal merit systems. The Board was 
established by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1978, which was codified by the Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Public Law No. 95-454. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . MSPB carries out its statutory responsibilities and authorities primarily by 
adjudicating individual employee appeals and by conducting merit systems studies. In 
addition, MSPB reviews the significant actions of the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) to assess the degree to which those actions may affect merit. 
Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See How to File an Appeal, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BOARD, http://www.mspb.g 
ov/appeals/appeals.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2018). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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hearing conferences and a full hearing on matters of both fact and law.70  Once 
the hearing is complete, the ALJ will issue an initial decision that can be 
appealed to the MSPB or directly to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.71  If the petitioner-appellant appeals to the MSPB, a three Board member 
panel reviews the case and issues a final decision.72  Finally, the employee’s 
options are only exhausted once an appeal of the MPSB decision is made to the 
Federal Circuit.73  The federal judiciary has been forced to grapple with 
competing precedent when defining its role in addressing security clearance 
denials and revocations that involve alleged constitutional violations. 
II. DEBATE WAGES OVER THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN SECURITY CLEARANCE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Egan Decision: Defining National Security Jurisprudence 
In 1981, Thomas Egan lost his job as a civilian employee for the Navy when 
his security clearance application was denied because he failed to disclose prior 
convictions for federal gun charges.74  Egan responded by appealing the denial— 
first through the Department of the Navy, and then through the MSPB.75  The 
Board accepted Egan’s appeal as a result of the disparate employment decision 
that resulted from the failure to acquire a security clearance.76  During the 
hearing, the government stated the MSPB had limited ability to review the case 
because “the Board did not have the authority to judge the merits of the 
underlying security-clearance determination.”77  Initially, a MSPB official 
reversed the Navy’s decision, requiring the department to explain the specific 
reasons for denying the clearance and prove that those reasons were reasonably 
related to national security concerns.78  However, the Navy was granted a review 
of that decision by the full Board in which the Board unanimously held that the 
statutory language and legislative history of the enabling statute did not require 
                                                 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 521 (1988) (“[T]he Director of the Naval 
Civilian Personnel Command issued a letter of intent to deny respondent a security clearance.  This 
was based upon California and Washington state criminal records reflecting respondent’s 
convictions for assault and for being a felon in possession of a gun, and further based upon his 
failure to disclose on his application for federal employment two earlier convictions for carrying a 
loaded firearm.  The Navy also referred to respondent’s own statements that he had had drinking 
problems in the past and had served the final 28 days of a sentence in an alcohol rehabilitation 
program.”). 
 75. Id. at 522. 
 76. Id. at 522–23. 
 77. Id. at 523. 
 78. Id. 
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or authorize a review of clearance decisions.79  Egan petitioned to the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the MSPB’s final decision.80 
When elevated to the Supreme Court, the Court granted cert and reversed the 
Federal Circuit’s decision following a review of the statutory language and 
national security concerns that clearly attach to security clearance procedures 
and policies.81  In examining Egan’s claim, the Court’s explanation for the 
decision was two-fold.  Reviewing the language of § 7513, Justice Blackmun 
stated a clearance denial or revocation did not amount to an “adverse action” as 
defined in the statute.82  The Court concluded there was no “right” to a clearance, 
and therefore, the decision to grant or revoke such a clearance “requires an 
affirmative act of discretion on the part of the granting official.”83  In explaining 
the Court’s deference, Justice Blackmun posited: 
A clearance does not equate with passing judgment upon an 
individual’s character. Instead, it is only an attempt to predict his 
possible future behavior and to assess whether, under compulsion of 
circumstances or for other reasons, he might compromise sensitive 
information. It may be based, to be sure, upon past or present conduct, 
but it also may be based upon concerns completely unrelated to 
conduct, such as having close relatives residing in a country hostile to 
the United States. “[T]o be denied [clearance] on unspecified grounds 
in no way implies disloyalty or any other repugnant characteristic.”84 
The broad discretion standard adopted by the Court was also rooted in national 
security concerns within the power of the Executive.85  When handling national 
                                                 
 79. Id. at 524 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7512 (1978)). 
 80. Id. at 525. 
 81. Id. at 525–30. 
Presidents, in a series of Executive Orders, have sought to protect sensitive information 
and to ensure its proper classification throughout the Executive Branch by delegating this 
responsibility to the heads of agencies. . . . 
It should be obvious that no one has a “right” to a security clearance.  The grant of a 
clearance requires an affirmative act of discretion on the part of the granting official.  The 
general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when “clearly consistent with 
the interests of the national security.” 
Id. at 528. 
 82. Id. at 530.  Noting this, one commentator explained: 
[T]he Court explained that a denial of a security clearance is not an “adverse action” and, 
thus, is not subject to Board review.  The statute specifically entitles employees 
terminated for cause under § 7513 to procedural protections only, including 
determination of (1) whether such cause existed, (2) whether in fact clearance was 
denied, and (3) whether transfer to a non-sensitive position was feasible.  Therefore, 
according to the Court, the Board is not authorized to conduct further review into a 
decision to deny or revoke a security clearance. 
Patel, supra note 17, at 105 (footnotes omitted). 
 83. Egan, 484 U.S. at 528. 
 84. Id. at 528–29 (quoting Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 824 (1984)). 
 85. Id. at 527. 
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security issues, “courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to 
Presidential responsibilities.”86  Relying on this principle and the statutory 
language, the Egan Court set the tone for deference to agency decisions 
involving security clearance decisions.87 
B. Constitutional Claims in Security Clearance Jurisprudence 
Following the holding in Egan, courts have refused to conduct substantive 
reviews of security clearance decisions.88  Employees who lose employment as 
a direct result of a denial or revocation of a security clearance are only able to 
obtain a “surface” level review of the procedure, with no protection afforded 
regarding the reasons or policies behind the decision.89  As a result of the Egan 
decision, federal appellate courts have consistently ruled in favor of agencies 
when clearance decisions are brought before them.90  This reluctance to question 
agency judgment when reviewing the reasoning behind a clearance decision has 
been apparent throughout modern clearance jurisprudence. 
The Supreme Court failed to address how the appellate courts should handle 
the constitutional questions and due process concerns in Egan.  Following their 
decision, the Supreme Court offered insight into these concerns in Webster v. 
Doe.91  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) revoked the clearance and 
employment of an employee upon discovering that the individual was a 
homosexual.92  The individual challenged the Agency’s decision on separate 
                                                 
 86. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
 87. Egan, 484 U.S. at 527. 
 88. Patel, supra note 17, at 105–07. 
 89. Id. at 106. 
 90. See, e.g., Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93, 97–98 (1988) (involving a National Security 
Agency employee who was fired under § 7532 when he disclosed homosexual relationships that 
had occurred within the scope of his employment); Berry v. Conyers, 692 F.3d 1223, 1225, 1228–
29 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (involving two Department of Defense employees who were demoted and 
eventually lost their jobs as a result of a failure to receive a security clearance); Skees v. Dep’t of 
Navy, 864 F.2d 1576, 1577–79 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (involving an employee was terminated following 
the denial of security clearance and an inability of the Navy to find an alternative position with the 
department); Hegab v. Long, 716 F.3d 790, 791, 797 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 91. 486 U.S. 592, 594 (1988).  As one commentator explained: 
The Supreme Court has not clarified how Egan should limit Federal Circuit review since 
the late 1980s.  The most significant attempt appeared in Webster v. Doe, where a 
distinction was made between security clearance issues and constitutional claims. . . . 
The Court ruled that APA review was precluded because the employee’s security 
clearance was terminated through CIA power granted under the National Security Act.  
It determined that lower courts could hear other constitutional claims, however, not 
otherwise prohibited by statute. 
Pollack, supra note 14, at 147. 
 92. Webster, 486 U.S. at 595.  The Court explained that Webster failed to allege an 
unconstitutional policy had existed at the CIA: 
We share the confusion of the Court of Appeals as to the precise nature of respondent’s 
constitutional claims.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain from the amended 
complaint whether respondent contends that his termination, based on his homosexuality, 
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grounds: that the decision violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and 
that it deprived him of his Fifth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection 
rights.93  The Supreme Court refused to review the Agency’s decision under the 
APA because the Agency satisfied the required “arbitrary and capricious 
standard” in its decision-making.94 
Again, relying on the statutory language and legislative intent, the Supreme 
Court explained that the National Security Act, which granted the CIA the 
authority to handle clearance and employment decisions, was clear in restricting 
judicial review of agency decisions.95  However, the Supreme Court left the door 
open for substantive review of constitutional claims.96 
In the wake of the Egan and Doe decisions, the federal judiciary has struggled 
to balance the broad discretion standard with the requirement to allow review of 
constitutional claims.97  Security clearance questions pertaining to Fifth 
                                                 
is constitutionally impermissible, or whether he asserts that a more pervasive 
discrimination policy exists in the CIA’s employment practices regarding all 
homosexuals.  This ambiguity in the amended complaint is no doubt attributable in part 
to the inconsistent explanations respondent received from the Agency itself regarding his 
termination.  Prior to his discharge, respondent had been told by two CIA security officers 
that his homosexual activities themselves violated CIA regulations.  In contrast, the 
Deputy General Counsel of the CIA later informed respondent that homosexuality was 
merely a security concern that did not inevitably result in termination, but instead was 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
Id. at 602. 
 93. Id. at 596. 
 94. See id. at 603–05. 
 95. Id. at 603. 
 96. Id. at 604–05 (“Petitioner also contends that even if respondent has raised a colorable 
constitutional claim arising out of his discharge, Congress in the interest of national security may 
deny the courts the authority to decide the claim and to order respondent’s reinstatement if the claim 
is upheld . . . . [W]e do not think Congress meant to impose such restrictions when it enacted § 
102(c) of the NSA.  Even without such prohibitory legislation from Congress, of course, traditional 
equitable principles requiring the balancing of public and private interests control the grant of 
declaratory or injunctive relief in the federal courts.”). 
 97. Victor R. Donovan, Administrative and Judicial Review of Security Clearance Actions: 
Post Egan, 35 A.F.L. REV. 323, 333–34 (1991) (explaining that although most courts err on the 
side of heavy discretion in the agency’s favor, the federal judiciary has been unable to consistently 
apply the Webster decision while affording significant weight to the agency’s final decision).  
Additionally, federal courts have struggled to handle Title VII and other constitutional claims 
involving security clearance procedures.  Id. at 331–34.  The article points specifically to the case 
of Jamil v. Defense Mapping Agency, 910 F.2d 1203 (4th Cir. 1990), as an example of this issue, 
stating: 
It is questionable whether the Federal courts will allow Title VII attacks upon security 
clearance actions. . . . 
. . . In Jamil v. Defense Mapping Agency, the plaintiff appealed the revocation of his 
security clearance and subsequent removal from employment for financial 
irresponsibility. . . . Although Jamil conceded that Egan prevented the MSPP and the 
Federal courts from hearing the merits of his security revocation, he argued he could still 
challenge his revocation on the grounds that it violated other substantive laws [such as 
Title VII], and that the agency failed to follow its own procedures. . . . 
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Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection claims have been particularly 
difficult for the courts to handle.98  The federal judiciary has been inconsistent 
on handling Fifth Amendment claims in the context of security clearance 
revocations and denials.99  The only consistency with constitutional claims is the 
skepticism through which the court views alleged violations of Fifth 
Amendment Due Process following a clearance removal.100  The judiciary’s 
struggle to balance constitutional claims with the broad discretion standard has 
led the courts to continue to favor deference to the agency.101  As agency 
deference grows, criticism of the current standard as it pertains to employee 
rights has risen in tandem.102 
C. The Pitfalls of Judicial Deference 
Skeptics of the Supreme Court’s holding in Egan take particular issue with 
the lack of effective relief for an employee who faces an adverse employment 
decision resulting from a security clearance denial.103  Further, without 
protections, critics of the broad discretion standard worry agencies can abuse 
clearance denials to effectively remove employees without scrutiny.104  Under 
the current format, procedural failures by the agency are the only protection an 
employee is afforded.105  The minimum requirements set by the court when 
                                                 
. . . The court specifically refused to reach the question of whether Egan would prevent 
it from reviewing the revocation of a security clearance if Jamil had raised a genuine 
issue of fact as to the existence of pretext. Although it refused to reach this question, the 
court’s unwillingness to reiterate that this decision is beyond court review may indicate 
it believes it could consider the merits of a revocation to determine whether it was 
pretextual. 
Id. at 331–32 (footnotes omitted). 
 98. Id. at 332–34. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 332 (“To date several federal circuits have considered whether constitutional 
challenges to security clearance actions have survived Egan.  Although the law in this area is still 
being developed, the courts that have considered the issue have agreed that the merits of the 
decision are not reviewable by a court or board.  These courts have also agreed that substantive due 
process attacks upon security clearance revocations are not well founded. What is less clear is 
whether Egan allows courts to consider attacks upon security clearance actions based upon alleged 
violations of equal protection guarantees.”). 
 101. See Patel, supra note 17, at 106–08. 
 102. Id. at 94 (“Egan is becoming increasingly relevant today.  In 2010, the Board decided two 
cases addressing whether Egan’s limitations should extend to adverse actions involving employees 
in ‘non-critical sensitive’ positions.  The Board has exhibited a willingness to broaden Egan’s 
narrow jurisdictional limitation beyond review of security clearance denials or revocations to also 
bar review of whether an employee can hold other sensitive positions.  These cases highlight the 
Boards tendency to allow the executive branch unchecked discretion regarding national security 
decisions.”). 
 103. Id. at 105–07. 
 104. Id. at 106–08. 
 105. Id. at 107 (“[The current judicial review] is limited to procedural review of: (1) whether 
a clearance was actually denied, (2) whether the position required the security clearance, and (3) 
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reviewing the agency’s effectiveness in following the appropriate processes can 
be easily met if the agency allowed the employee to (1) receive notice of the 
revocation and subsequent termination, (2) have an opportunity to respond, and 
(3) obtain notice of the reasoning behind the decision—so long as the agency 
does not invoke the national security exemption.106 
Agencies are able to rely on the current standard to ensure the proper 
procedures are followed in order to revoke or deny a clearance without providing 
any significant insight into the reasoning.107  The current model could reasonably 
incentivize agencies to make arbitrary or malicious employment decisions with 
security clearances as the vehicle for such action.  Additionally, those in 
academia who are critical of the modern clearance jurisprudence point to the 
lack of substantive evaluations as a restriction on alternative claims against a 
revocation or denial.108  Without the ability to review a clearance revocation on 
its merits, an employee is unable to bring forth additional statutory claims, such 
as a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.109  As a result of these 
restrictions, statutory alternatives have been proposed to remedy the broad 
agency discretion.110 
Critics of the modern clearance jurisprudence have offered amendments that 
would alter the CSRA and the statutory scheme that currently precludes review 
of MSPB clearance reviews.111  The most substantial change would allow merit-
                                                 
whether the statutory procedures in § 7513 were followed. . . . The Court’s three-pronged review 
is superficial.  The first two elements are questions of fact that the Board can answer simply by 
looking at the record.  These questions only provide protection from dishonest terminations, i.e., if 
the agency terminates an employee when a security clearance was not actually required for the 
position or if the security clearance was not actually denied. In most cases, though, this is not what 
the employee disputes.  An employee could claim that his position should not have required a 
security clearance, but the Board cannot review that designation either.  As a result, these two 
questions provide little to no protection.”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. at 107–12. 
 109. Id. at 108–09 (stating that without the ability to review the merits of a security clearance 
decision, a court is unable to find a Title VII violation, and “[t]herefore, employees in protected 
classes are unable to seek review of the underlying security clearance decisions that lead to their 
terminations.”). 
 110. Id. at 114. 
 111. Id. (outlining a legislative change the CSRA to include merit based reviews and a two-
part statutory scheme).  The article proposes the following: 
First, it should amend § 7512 to include adverse security clearance decisions in the list 
of actions covered by the subchapter.  Specifically, it should add “(6) a denial, 
suspension, or revocation of a security clearance” after § 7512(5). 
Second, Congress should amend § 7513 by adding a provision after § 7513(d) as follows: 
(e) An employee whose termination under this section arises from the employee’s 
security clearance being denied, suspended, or revoked is entitled to appeal to the Merit 
Systems Protection Board under § 7701 of this title.  The Merit Systems Protection Board 
shall have the authority to review the merits of the decision denying, suspending, or 
revoking the employee’s security clearance. 
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based reviews of all security clearance decisions.112  Further, the offered change 
in statutory language would allow the federal judiciary to have an expanded role 
in reviewing MSPB decisions.113  The legislative change would explicitly 
overrule the Supreme Court’s current view of post-Egan security clearance 
jurisprudence.114 
If Congress were to undertake such a legislative initiative, the new standard 
would allow for all employees who face adverse employment decisions as a 
result of a clearance denial or revocation to receive a full merit based review of 
the agency’s decision.115  Moreover, the new approach would have the implied 
effect of requiring judges to begin questioning agency decisions that involve 
national security questions.116  Such a change would be a significant departure 
from the judiciary’s modern position of deferring to the Executive Branch on 
matters involving national security.  However, skeptics of full merit based 
review and increased judicial oversight have concerns that are rooted in the 
belief that national security decisions are solely the prerogative of the 
Executive.117 
D. Justifying Agency Discretion 
The Court’s deference to agency judgment is not without legitimate purpose 
or reason.  Although the current standard restricts an employee’s ability to obtain 
review, courts are faced with the difficult challenge of balancing national 
security interests.  When reviewing security clearance jurisprudence, legal 
scholars have noted that the current model respects the separation of powers by 
following Congressional statutory language and preserving Executive control of 
national security matters.118  Specifically, supporters of agency discretion 
                                                 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 114–15. 
 114. See id. at 114. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 115. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Pollack, supra note 14, at 151–52; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export, 299 
U.S. 304, 318–19 (1936) (explaining that executive branch is the sole organ of national security).  
In Curtiss-Wright Export, the Supreme Court explained: 
The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain 
diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the 
Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of 
nationality. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold 
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the 
nation.  He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone 
negotiates.  Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is 
powerless to invade it. 
Curtis-Wright Export, 299 U.S. at 318–19.  
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believe that Egan and its progeny are consistent with the long standing Political 
Question and State Action doctrines, as the court does not usurp its 
constitutionally mandated authority.119  The argument by those in favor of full 
agency deference, including on those issues involving constitutional claims, is 
rooted in the belief that any expansion of judicial review would be in conflict 
with separation of powers, which assigns national security powers to the 
Executive Branch.120 
Denying merit based reviews is not seen as a ploy to restrict employee rights 
by supporters of the Court, but rather an attempt to uphold and protect 
“constitutional principles.”121  Additionally, a concern exists that the judiciary 
would be unable to handle sensitive national security questions involved in the 
merits of a clearance, an area that courts do not have extensive expertise.122  The 
Supreme Court admitted in Egan that it often does not possess the expertise to 
handle those national security questions reserved for the Executive.123 
Most controversially, supporters of modern clearance jurisprudence explain 
that a distinction between Webster and Egan exists, allowing for courts to avoid 
constitutional reviews of clearance denials or revocations.124  These scholars 
claim that the Webster decision “merely concedes that the courts can hear 
constitutional claims associated with an employee’s termination not otherwise 
prohibited by statute” while still deferring to the agency’s discretion when 
revoking a clearance.125  Therefore, courts can avoid answering constitutional 
questions when security clearances are challenged. 
The diverse viewpoints on both sides of the modern Egan debate demonstrate 
the difficult issues courts face when deciding whether to review a security 
clearance decision.126  Scholars who advocate for legislative change overlook 
                                                 
 119. Pollack, supra note 14, at 151–52 (“The Egan decision plainly states that no person has a 
‘right’ to a security clearance, and the grant of such a privilege must come from an official with 
authority.  Furthermore, such an order can only be granted when it is ‘clearly consistent with the 
interests of the national security.’  National security interests and determinations are reserved for 
executive and legislative branch resolution. . . . This ruling conforms to both the Political Question 
and State Action Doctrines by keeping courts removed from national security determinations 
reserved for the Executive.”). 
 120. Id. at 151–52. 
 121. Id. at 154. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1988) (“Thus, unless Congress specifically 
has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the 
Executive in military and national security affairs.”). 
 124. Pollack, supra note 14, at 151–53. 
 125. Id. at 153. 
 126. Compare Patel, supra note 17, at 117 (“As it stands, an employee terminated based on a 
security clearance denial or revocation is precluded from seeking substantive review of her 
termination, whereas an employee terminated for any other reason can seek full review with the 
MSPB.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Egan is a roadblock to the rights of government 
employees.  Only congressional action amending the CSRA will effectively eliminate this 
roadblock and guarantee a terminated employee MSPB review of the underlying security clearance 
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the need to protect national security information.127  Furthermore, their approach 
avoids addressing the separation of powers question that arises from each 
clearance review.  Those who support the Egan decision’s broad holding rely on 
such shortcomings to defend their position.128  However, these supporters seem 
to ignore that the decision in Webster allowed merit based reviews of 
constitutional questions involving any adverse employment action, even if the 
decision involves national security implications.129  The question remains: Can 
the judiciary find a viable middle ground in modern security clearance law? 
III. CURRENT SECURITY CLEARANCE JURISPRUDENCE OPENS THE DOOR FOR A 
NEW APPROACH 
A. The Hegab Background 
The case of Hegab v. Long130 represents an opportunity for clarity in the 
security clearance arena.  After obtaining a top secret clearance in January of 
2010, Mahmoud Hegab began orientation for his employment at the National 
                                                 
decisions that resulted in her termination.”), with Pollack, supra note 14, at 157 (“There is a delicate 
balance between the interests of federal employees and national security.  The interests of the 
former must be protected, but such protection should not come at the expense of the latter.  There 
are alternative procedures that exist to protect federal employees without requiring judicial inquiry 
into a sensitive security clearance issue.  As a result, the Federal Circuit should separate itself from 
security clearance questions.”), and Donovan, supra note 97, at 336 (“Assuming the Supreme Court 
eventually holds security clearance determinations to be nonjusticiable . . . it will demonstrate the 
Supreme Court’s recognition that the routine keeping of the nation’s secrets must, as a practical 
matter, be entrusted to the executive branch.”). 
 127. See Patel, supra note 17, at 115. 
 128. See Pollack, supra note 14, at 152–53. 
 129. Id.; Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 604–05 (1988); see also Pollack, supra note 14, at 
152–53. 
 130. 716 F.3d 790, 791 (4th Cir. 2013).  In writing for the majority, Circuit Judge Niemeyer 
explained the facts and history of the case as follows: 
Hegab commenced this action under the Administrative Procedure Act against the NGA 
and its Director to reverse the NGA’s decision, to reinstate his security clearance, and to 
award him back pay, benefits, and attorneys’ fees.  In his complaint, he alleged that he 
presented “overwhelming evidence” to refute the NGA’s conclusions and that the NGA 
staff “did not take the time or effort to review” the facts or “assumed that anything with 
the name ‘Islam’ associated with it is a subversive terrorist organization.”  He alleged 
that “[i]f the latter is true . . . [his] constitutionally protected rights of freedom of religion, 
freedom of expression, and freedom of association” were violated.  The district court 
dismissed Hegab’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), concluding 
that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to review a security clearance 
determination. 
We conclude that Hegab’s speculative and conclusory allegations of constitutional 
violations were essentially recharacterizations of his challenge to the merits of the NGA’s 
security clearance determination and that we do not have jurisdiction to review such a 
determination. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
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Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA).131  During the orientation, Hegab 
disclosed to a security officer that he had married Bushra Nusairat following his 
clearance investigation.132  The disclosure of new information prompted the 
NGA to re-investigate Hegab’s clearance, and by November of the same year, 
the agency issued a ruling revoking the clearance.133  The statement of reasons 
released by the agency stated that Hegab and his wife’s association with foreign 
governments and organizations “present[ed] an elevated foreign influence risk 
that [wa]s problematic and unacceptable to the national security of the United 
States.”134  Hegab appealed his revocation to the NGA and, after receiving a 
final rejection in 2011, filed suit against the agency.135  Although Hegab 
conceded that “courts are generally without subject-matter jurisdiction to review 
an agency’s security clearance decision,”136 his suit alleged the revocation 
violated his “constitutionally protected rights of freedom of religion, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of association.”137 
The district court dismissed Hegab’s claim, stating it did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction.138  Hegab appealed that decision to the Fourth Circuit, which 
concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing the former NGA 
                                                 
 131. Id. at 791–92. 
 132. Id. at 792. 
 133. Id. 
 134. The complete list of reasons provided by NGA for the clearance re-investigation and 
revocation were: 
(1) that Hegab, his parents, and his siblings held dual citizenship with the United States 
and Egypt; (2) that Hegab still possessed an Egyptian passport and that it would require 
contact with foreign national government officials for Hegab to renounce his Egyptian 
citizenship and turn in his passport, which would increase the potential that he would be 
monitored by foreign intelligence services; (3) that Hegab stated that he was 80% certain 
that his wife held dual citizenship with Jordan; (4) that Hegab reported “continuing 
contact with multiple foreign nationals (including relatives), some of whom reside 
outside of the Continental United States”; (5) that Hegab had reported residing in Egypt 
from May 2004 to November 2007; (6) that Hegab’s spouse had attended and graduated 
“from the Islamic Saudi Academy, whose curriculum, syllabus, and materials are 
influenced, funded, and controlled by the Saudi government”; and (7) that “[i]nformation 
available through open sources identifies [Hegab’s] spouse as being or having been 
actively involved with one or more organizations which consist of groups who are 
organized largely around their non-United States origin and/or their advocacy of or 
involvement in foreign political issues.” 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 135. Id. at 793. 
 136. Id. at 794.  The court stated: 
Both Hegab and the NGA appear to agree with the proposition that no one has a right to 
a security clearance and that the grant of a security clearance is a highly discretionary act 
of the Executive Branch.  They also recognize that the Fourth Circuit has concluded that 
security clearance determinations are generally not subject to judicial review. 
Id. at 793. 
 137. Id. at 791. 
 138. Id. at 793. 
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employee’s claim.139  Writing for the majority, Judge Niemeyer concluded, 
“Hegab’s constitutional allegations are conclusory only, resting on his 
disagreement with the NGA’s decision on the merits.”140  Therefore, under the 
Egan standard, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Hegab’s claim must be 
dismissed because the judiciary does not have the authority to review the merits 
or evidentiary conclusions of a security clearance decision.141 
B. Finding a Middle Ground: The Hegab Approach 
Although the Fourth Circuit’s holding was standard in security clearance 
appeals, the concurring opinion written by Judge Motz proposed a solution on 
how courts could “reconcile” the Egan and Webster decisions.142  Specifically, 
she suggested that constitutional claims resulting from a clearance revocation or 
denial could be subject to judicial review.143  In her concurring opinion, Judge 
Motz opined: 
If Egan stood alone, clearly it would require dismissal here too. But in 
Webster v. Doe, decided the same term as Egan, the Supreme Court 
appeared to hold, over vigorous dissents, that federal courts have 
jurisdiction to review constitutional challenges to security-related 
employment decisions. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . In light of the holding in Egan, at most Webster permits judicial 
review of a security clearance denial only when that denial results 
from the application of an allegedly unconstitutional policy.144 
Through her concurrence, Judge Motz offers an approach that will afford 
constitutional protections to employees without significantly impeding upon the 
Executive’s control of national security matters.145  By allowing reviews only of 
unconstitutional policies, the court would be restricted to review only the merits 
of the policy, rather than the specific factors that played a role in the denial or 
                                                 
 139. See id. at 791. 
 140. Id. at 796. 
 141. Id. (“In its security clearance determination, the NGA concluded that Hegab had failed to 
mitigate its concern of ‘an elevated foreign influence risk that is problematic and unacceptable to 
the national security of the United States,’ and this conclusion is one in which the NGA ‘should 
have the final say,’ and in which courts should not intrude.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting 
Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988))). 
 142. Id. at 798 (Motz, J., concurring). 
 143. Id. at 797–98 (Motz, J., concurring). 
 144. Id. at 798 (Motz, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).  Although Judge Motz claims 
unconstitutional policies should be subject to review, in that case, “Hegab allege[d] no 
unconstitutional policy but only an assertedly unconstitutional individualized adverse 
determination, [and therefore] his claim fail[ed].” Id. (Motz, J., concurring). 
 145. Id. (stating that “nothing in Webster indicates that it overruled Egan,” and that courts 
could still assess the constitutionality of a policy claim “without delving into the merits of an 
individualized security clearance determination”). 
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revocation of an individual’s clearance.146  Such a limited review would keep 
the judiciary from impinging on clear boundaries, which would otherwise risk 
exposing national security secrets.  In other words, specific decisions made 
during an individual clearance review process would remain shielded from 
scrutiny. 
The concern within intelligence and security communities that reviewing 
clearance revocations may expose sensitive materials can be assuaged by 
judicial review that only focuses on internal policies.147  During these reviews, 
the judiciary would have no need to request classified materials as the 
proceeding would have no bearing on the individual’s conduct.  Rather, the 
court’s focus would be on the institutional policy that is alleged to have violated 
the employee’s constitutional right.  Thus, the court could provide protection for 
an employee and render a decision that has no bearing on the sensitive material 
involved in the agency’s revocation decision of an individual. 
Additionally, agencies would be unable to promulgate arbitrary revocation 
policies that restrict the constitutional rights of its employees.  Judge Motz’s 
opinion presents an opportunity for the federal courts to ensure that agencies are 
not engaging in unlawful discrimination when establishing revocation policies.  
Agencies would be required to ensure security clearance policies are in line with 
federal law as a safeguard for individuals facing revocation. 
Moreover, a change in posture from the federal judiciary would have the 
added benefit of encouraging agency transparency when outlining security 
clearance procedures.  However, under this standard the courts would still be 
able to afford deference to the agency by refusing to delve into the intricate 
details of an individual’s revocation.  Unlike other reformers, The Hegab 
Approach sufficiently considers the national security concerns implicated in a 
security clearance decision.148  The current clearance procedures have left many 
                                                 
 146. Id. 
 147. Presumptively, prohibiting the judicial review of individual security clearance 
determinations will limit the chances that sensitive material is exposed in the process. See id. 
 148. See Jason Rathod, Note, Not Peace, But a Sword: Navy v. Egan and the Case Against 
Judicial Abdication in Foreign Affairs, 59 DUKE L.J. 595, 597–98 (2009).  In that Note, the author 
argued that, 
lower courts [should] change course by reopening judicial review of the merits of security 
clearance determinations, making injured plaintiffs whole, deterring future racial 
discrimination, and avoiding a chilling effect on agency adjudicators. 
In short, to reclaim its role in the United States’ system of separation of powers, the 
judiciary should not use the Constitution to make peace with the political branches of 
government, but rather, should wield it as a sword. 
Id. at 635.  However, the author fails to recognize the national security implications of a complete 
and detailed review of the merits of a clearance revocation, as a “substantive review of a security 
clearance revocation . . . creates a separation of powers issue by requiring an inquiry into a sensitive 
area in which [the court] lacks expertise.  This creates a risk that the security clearance system was 
developed to prevent.”  Pollack, supra note 14, at 155 (footnotes omitted). 
210 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:189 
federal employees clouded by uncertainty following a revocation decision.149  
Through a middle ground approach, the Supreme Court would establish a 
consistent review policy that would effectively balance constitutional and 
national security concerns. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As security clearances come to the forefront of public debate for the first time, 
the Supreme Court has the opportunity to grant clarity in clearance 
jurisprudence.  Through reconciling the decisions in Egan and Webster, the 
Court can afford protection to employees while respecting the tenants of 
Executive power.  Refusing to apply Webster in the context of security clearance 
decisions would continue to restrict the constitutional rights of employees facing 
an adverse employment decision as the result of a denial or revocation. 
The call to modernize security clearance jurisprudence post-Egan is long 
overdue as the issue comes to light on the national stage for the first time.  Now 
is the time for the judiciary to shift course with the common sense Hegab 
approach.  Courts remaining on the current course in security clearance 
jurisprudence will only lend more confusion to the issue and inadequate support 
for the constitutional rights of employees requiring a clearance. 
Although a noble idea, a complete overhaul of clearance reviews post-Egan, 
would require the de-classification of sensitive materials and have the 
unintended effect of harming national security.  The new middle ground 
approach established in the Hegab concurrence accomplishes the incredibly 
difficult task of safeguarding national security, while also ensuring that the 
constitutional rights of employees are protected.  The Supreme Court would be 
wise to adopt the approach taken by Judge Motz in Hegab and provide a 
comprehensive solution to the problems that arise from a security clearance 
dispute. 
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